

**The Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Norfolk
Annual Investment and Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2021/22**

1. Background

- 1.1 The PCC is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the PCC's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 1.2 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the PCC's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the PCC, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the PCC can meet his capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet PCC risk or cost objectives.
- 1.3 The contribution the treasury management function makes to the PCC is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.
- 1.4 CIPFA defines treasury management as:

"The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."
- 1.5 This PCC has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no non-treasury investments.

2. Reporting requirements

Capital Strategy

- 2.1 The CIPFA 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require, for 2021/22, all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report, which will provide the following:
- a high-level long-term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
 - an overview of how the associated risk is managed
 - the implications for future financial sustainability
- 2.2 The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that the PCC fully understands the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.
- 2.3 The Capital Strategy will be published separately but is included within the PCC's Budget and MTFP report.

Treasury Management reporting

- 2.4 The PCC is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.
- a. Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
- the capital plans, (including prudential indicators); (Annex 1)
 - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how unfunded capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time); (Annex 2)
 - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
 - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).
- b. A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update the PCC on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c. An annual treasury report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

3. Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22

3.1 The strategy for 2021/22 covers two main areas:

Capital issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators; see Annex 1.
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy. See Annex 2.

Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the PCC;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

Training

3.2 The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that officers with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This also applies to Audit Committee members responsible for scrutiny. Training on the Prudential Code and the Capital Strategy was provided to Audit Committee members in October 2018.

Treasury management consultants

3.3 The PCC uses Link Asset Services as its external treasury management advisors. The current contract with Link expires on 31 August 2022.

3.4 The PCC recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regard to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

3.5 It is also recognised that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The PCC will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

The Treasury Management Function

- 3.6 The CIPFA Code defines treasury management activities as “the management of the PCC’s investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”
- 3.7 The PCC regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the PCC, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.
- 3.8 The PCC acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and to employing suitable comprehensive performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management.
- 3.9 The PCC is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations ensures this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity before considering investment return.
- 3.10 A further function of the treasury management service is to provide for the borrowing requirement of the PCC, essentially the longer term cash flow planning, typically 30 years plus, to ensure the PCC can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using internal cash balances on a temporary basis. Debt previously borrowed may be restructured to meet PCC risk or cost objectives.
- 3.11 The PCC has delegated responsibility for treasury management decisions taken within the approved strategy to the PCC CFO. Day to day execution and administration of investment and borrowing decisions is undertaken by Specialist Accountants based in the Joint Finance Department for Suffolk and Norfolk Constabularies.
- 3.12 External treasury management services continue to be provided by Link Asset Services in a joint contract with the PCC for Suffolk. Link Asset Services provides a range of services which include:
- Technical support on treasury matters and capital finance issues.
 - Economic and interest rate analysis.
 - Debt services which includes advice on the timing of long term borrowing.

- Debt rescheduling advice surrounding the existing portfolio.
- Generic investment advice on interest rates, timing and investment instruments.
- Credit ratings/market information service for the three main credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poors).

3.13 Whilst Link Asset Services provide support to the treasury function, under market rules and in accordance with the CIPFA Code of Practice, the final decision on treasury matters remains with the PCC.

3.14 Performance will continue to be monitored and reported to the PCC as part of the budget monitoring report.

3.15 Link Asset Service's Economic Forecast is set out in Annex 3.

4. Investment Strategy 2021/22

4.1 Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.10% for a considerable period. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it may be best to assume that investment earnings from money market-related instruments will be sub 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

- Q1 2021 - 0.10%
- Q1 2022 - 0.10%
- Q1 2023 - 0.10%

4.2 The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

Financial Year	Budgeted Interest Earnings
2020/21	0.1%
2021/22	0.1%
2022/23	0.1%
2023/24	0.1%
2024/25	0.25%
Later Years	2.00%

The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably to the downside due to the weight of all the uncertainties over Brexit, as well as a softening global economic picture.

The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus and how quickly successful vaccines may become available and widely administered to the population. It may also be affected by what, if any, deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.

There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, or a return of investor confidence in equities, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

Negative investment rates

While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, and in November omitted any mention of negative rates in the minutes of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.

As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have continued to drift lower. Some managers have already resorted to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. Investor cash flow uncertainty, and the need to maintain liquidity in these unprecedented times, has meant there is a surfeit of money swilling around at the very short end of the market. This has seen a number of market operators, now including the DMADF, offer nil or negative rates for very short term maturities. This is not universal, and MMFs are still offering a marginally positive return, as are a number of financial institutions for investments at the very short end of the yield curve.

Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.

4.3 There are 3 key considerations to the treasury management investment process. MHCLG's Investment Guidance ranks these in the following order of importance:

- security of principal invested,
- liquidity for cash flow, and

- investment return (yield).

Each deposit is considered in the context of these 3 factors, in that order.

4.4 MHCLG's Investment Guidance requires local authorities and PCCs to invest prudently and give priority to security and liquidity before yield, as described above. In order to facilitate this objective, the Guidance requires the PCC to have regard to CIPFA's Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Sector.

4.5 The key requirements of both the Code and the Investment Guidance are to produce an Annual Investment and Treasury Strategy covering the following:

- Guidelines for choosing and placing investments – Counterparty Criteria and identification of the maximum period for which funds can be committed – Counterparty Monetary and Time Limits.
- Details of Specified and Non-Specified investment types.

5. Investment Strategy 2021/22 - Counterparty Criteria

5.1 The PCC works closely with its external treasury advisors to determine the criteria for high quality institutions.

5.2 The criteria for providing a pool of high-quality investment counterparties for inclusion on the PCC's 'Approved Authorised Counterparty List' is provided below

- **UK Banks** which have the following minimum ratings from at least one of the three credit rating agencies:

UK Banks	Fitch	Standard & Poors	Moody's
Short Term Ratings	F1	A-1	P-1
Long Term Ratings	A-	A-	A3

- **Non-UK Banks** domiciled in a country which has a minimum sovereign rating of AA+ and have the following minimum ratings from at least one of the credit rating agencies:

Non-UK Banks	Fitch	Standard & Poors	Moody's
Short Term Ratings	F1+	A-1+	P-1
Long Term Ratings	AA-	AA-	Aa3

- **Part Nationalised UK Banks** – Royal Bank of Scotland Group (including Nat West). These banks are included while they continue to be part nationalised or they meet the minimum rating criteria for UK Banks above.
- **The PCC’s Corporate Banker** – If the credit ratings of the PCC’s corporate banker (currently Barclays Bank plc) fall below the minimum criteria for UK Banks above, then cash balances held with that bank will be for account operation purposes only and balances will be minimised in terms of monetary size and time.
- **Building Societies** – The PCC will use Building Societies which meet the ratings for UK Banks outlined above.
- **Money Market Funds (MMFs)** – which are rated AAA by at least one of the three major rating agencies. MMF’s are ‘pooled funds’ investing in high-quality, high-liquidity, short-term securities such as treasury bills, repurchase agreements and certificate of deposit. Funds offer a high degree of counterparty diversification that include both UK and Overseas Banks.
- **UK Government** – including the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility & Sterling Treasury Bills. Sterling Treasury Bills are short-term (up to six months) ‘paper’ issued by the UK Government. In the same way that the Government issues Gilts to meet long term funding requirements, Treasury Bills are used by Government to meet short term revenue obligations. They have the security of being issued by the UK Government.
- **Local Authorities, PCCs etc.** – Includes those in England and Wales (as defined in Section 23 of the Local Government Act 2003) or a similar body in Scotland or Northern Ireland.

5.3 All cash invested by the PCC in 2021/22 will be either Sterling deposits (including certificates of deposit) or Sterling Treasury Bills invested with banks and other institutions in accordance with the Approved Authorised Counterparty List.

5.4 The Code of Practice requires local authorities and PCCs to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for use, additional market information will be used to inform investment decisions. This additional market information includes, for example, Credit Default Swap rates and equity prices in order to compare the relative security of counterparties.

5.5 The current maximum lending limit of £10m for any counterparty will be maintained in 2021/22 to reflect the level of cash balances and to avoid large deposits with the DMO. Where there is a surplus of cash due to unplanned cashflows, in order to keep within the counterparty limit with the PCC’s bankers, the PCC will place investments using other secure liquid financial instruments, e.g. Money Market Funds.

5.6 In addition to individual institutional lending limits, “Group Limits” will be used whereby the collective investment exposure of individual banks within the same banking group is restricted to a group lending limit of £10m.

5.7 The Strategy permits deposits beyond 365 days (up to a maximum of 2 years) but only with UK banks which meet the credit ratings at paragraph 5.2. Deposits may also be placed with UK Part Nationalised Banks and Local Authorities for periods of up to 2 years.

5.8 A reasonable amount will be held on an instant access basis in order for the PCC to meet any unexpected needs. Instant access accounts are also preferable during periods of credit risk uncertainty in the markets, allowing the PCC to immediately withdraw funds should any concern arise over a particular institution.

6. Investment Strategy 2021/22 – Specified and Non-Specified Investments

6.1 As determined by CLG's Investment Guidance, Specified Investments offer "high security and high liquidity". They are Sterling denominated and have a maturity of less than one year or for a longer period but where the PCC has the right to be repaid within one year if he wishes. Institutions of "high" credit quality are deemed to be Specified Investments where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. From the pool of high quality investment counterparties identified in Section 5, the following are deemed to be Specified Investments :

- Banks: UK and Non-UK;
- Part Nationalised UK Banks;
- The PCC's Corporate Banker (Barclays Bank plc)
- Building Societies (which meet the minimum ratings criteria for Banks);
- Money Market Funds;
- UK Government;
- Local Authorities, PCCs etc.

6.2 Non-Specified Investments are those investments that do not meet the criteria of Specified Investments. From the pool of counterparties identified in Section 5, they include:

- Any investment that cannot be recalled within 365 days of initiation.

6.3 The categorisation of 'Non-Specified' does not in any way detract from the credit quality of these institutions, but is merely a requirement of the Government's guidance.

6.4 The PCC's proposed Strategy for 2021/22 therefore includes both Specified and Non-Specified Investment institutions.

7. Borrowing Strategy 2021/22

- 7.1 Capital expenditure can be funded immediately by applying capital receipts, capital grants or revenue contributions. Capital expenditure in excess of available capital resources or revenue contributions will increase the PCC's borrowing requirement. The PCC's need to borrow is measured by the Capital Financial Requirement (CFR), which simply represents the total outstanding capital expenditure, which has not yet been funded from either capital or revenue resources.
- 7.2 For the PCC, borrowing principally relates to long term loans (i.e. loans in excess of 365 days). The borrowing strategy includes decisions on the timing of when further monies should be borrowed.
- 7.3 Historically, the main source of long term loans has been the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), which is part of the UK Debt Management Office (DMO). The maximum period for which loans can be advanced by the PWLB is 50 years. On 26 November 2020, HM Treasury reversed the increase of 100 basis points that took place on 9 October 2019, following a response to a consultation that was published on 25 November 2020. Lending by the PWLB is now on the proviso that CFOs confirm that the authority does not intend to buy investment assets primarily for yield at any point in the next three years.
- 7.4 External borrowing currently stands at £23.81m (excluding PFI). At 31 March 2020 there was a £32.1m Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) relating to unfunded capital expenditure which had been financed from internal resources. The CFR is estimated to be £37.9m at 31 March 2021, £46.3m at 31 March 2022 and £50.5m at 31 March 2023. Additional long term borrowing is estimated at £10.4m for 2021/22, £8.1m for 2022/23 and £5.8m for 2023/24. The borrowing requirement does not include the funding requirement in respect of assets financed through PFI.
- 7.5 The challenging and uncertain economic outlook outlined by Link Asset Services in Annex 3, together with managing the cost of "carrying debt" requires a flexible approach to borrowing. The PCC, under delegated powers, will take the most appropriate form of borrowing depending on the prevailing interest rates at the time, taking into account the risks identified in Link Asset Services economic overview (Section 3).
- 7.6 The level of outstanding debt and composition of debt, in terms of individual loans, is kept under review. The PWLB provides a facility to allow the restructure of debt, including premature repayment of loans, and encourages local authorities and PCCs to do so when circumstances permit. This can result in net savings in overall interest charges. The PCC CFO and Link Asset Services will monitor prevailing rates for any opportunities during the year. As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term fixed interest rates, there may be potential opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the current treasury position and the size of the cost of debt repayment (premiums incurred). Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any residual potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt

- 7.7 The PCC has flexibility to borrow funds in the current year for use in future years, but will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the PCC can ensure the security of such funds
- 7.8 The PCC will continue to use the most appropriate source of borrowing at the time of making application, including; the PWLB, commercial market loans, Local Authorities and the Municipal Bond Agency.

8. Treasury Management Prudential Indicators

8.1 In addition to the key Treasury Indicators included in the Prudential Code and reported separately, there are two treasury management indicators. The purpose of the indicators is to restrict the activity of the treasury function to within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of an adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these indicators are too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/improve performance. The Indicators are:

- **Maturity Structures of Borrowing** – These gross limits are set to reduce the PCC’s exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing and require upper and lower limits. It is recommended that the PCC sets the following limits for the maturity structures of its borrowing at 31.3.21:

	Actual*	Lower Limit	Upper Limit
Under 12 months	0.8%	0%	15%
12 months and within 24 months	5.0%	0%	15%
24 months and within 5 years	14.7%	0%	45%
5 years and within 10 years	16.6%	0%	75%
10 years and above	62.9%	0%	100%

* Actual is based on existing balances at 10.12.20

- **Upper Limits to the Total of Principal Funds Invested for Greater than 365 Days** – This limit is set with regard to the PCC’s liquidity requirements. It is estimated that in 2021/22, the maximum level of PCC funds invested for periods greater than 365 days will be no more than £4.475m.

Prudential Code Indicators 2021/22, 2022/23, 2023/24

1. Background

1.1 The Prudential Code for capital investment came into effect on 1st April 2004. It replaced the complex regulatory framework, which only allowed borrowing if specific government authorisation had been received. The Prudential system is one based on self-regulation. All borrowing undertaken is self-determined under the prudential code. A revised Prudential Code was published in December 2017 and was applied from 2018/19.

1.2 Under Prudential arrangements the PCC can determine the borrowing limit for capital expenditure. The Government does retain reserve powers to restrict borrowing if that is required for national economic reasons.

1.3 The key objectives of the Code are to ensure, within a clear framework, that capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable. The Code specifies indicators that must be used and factors that must be taken into account. The Code requires the PCC to set and monitor performance on:

- capital expenditure
- affordability
- external debt
- treasury management (now included within Treasury Management strategy)

1.4 The required indicators are:

- Capital Expenditure Forecast
- Capital Financing Requirement
- Actual External Debt
- Authorised Limit for External Debt
- Operational Boundary Limit for External Debt

However authorities are now advised to use local indicators, where this would be beneficial, especially if carry out commercial activities.

1.5 Once determined, the indicators can be changed so long as this is reported to the PCC.

1.6 Actual performance against indicators will be monitored throughout the year. All the indicators will be reviewed and updated annually.

2. The Indicators

- 2.1 The **Capital Expenditure Payment Forecast** is detailed in Appendix E (of the PCC's Budget and MTFP report 2021/25). The total estimated payments are:

	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
	£m	£m	£m
Capital Expenditure Forecast	15.825	9.902	8.908

The PCC is being asked for approval to an overall Capital Programme based on the level of capital financing costs contained within the draft revenue budget.

- 2.2 The **ratio of capital financing costs to net revenue budget** shows the estimated annual revenue costs of borrowing (net interest payable on debt and the minimum revenue provision for repaying the debt), as a proportion of annual income from local taxation and non-specific government grants. The estimates include PFI MRP and interest costs. Estimates of the ratio of capital financing costs to net revenue budget for future years are:

Ratio of Capital Financing Costs to Net Revenue Budget		
2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate
4.75%	4.97%	5.23%

- 2.3 The **capital financing requirement** represents capital expenditure not yet financed by capital receipts, revenue contributions or capital grants. It measures the underlying need to borrow for capital purposes, although this borrowing may not necessarily take place externally. Estimates of the end of year capital financing requirement for future years are:

Capital Financing Requirement			
31/03/21 Estimate	31/03/22 Estimate	31/03/23 Estimate	31/03/24 Estimate
£94.457m	£101.555m	£103.941m	£104.737m

- 2.4 The guidance on **net borrowing for capital purposes** advises that:

“In order to ensure that over the medium term net borrowing will only be for a capital purpose, the PCC should ensure that net external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of capital financing requirement in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current and next two financial years.”

Net borrowing refers to the PCC's total external borrowing net of any temporary cash investments and must work within this requirement.

- 2.5 The Code defines the **authorised limit for external debt** as the sum of external borrowing and any other financing long-term liabilities e.g. finance leases. It is

recommended that the PCC approve the 2021/22 and future years limits. For 2021/22 this will be the statutory limit determined under section 3(1) of the Local Government Act 2003.

As required by the Code, the PCC is asked to delegate authority to the Chief Finance Officer (OPCCN), within the total limit for any individual year, to effect movement between the separate limits for borrowing and other long-term liabilities. Any such changes made will be reported to the PCC.

Authorised Limit for External Debt			
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
	£m	£m	£m
PWLB borrowing	33.873	40.492	45.060
Other long term liabilities (OCC PFI)	23.373	22.679	21.906
Other long term liabilities (PIC PFI)	31.848	30.771	29.634
Headroom	17.539	15.195	13.374
Total	106.633	109.138	109.974

These proposed limits are consistent with the Capital Programme. They provide headroom to allow for operational management, for example unusual cash movements.

- 2.6 The Code also requires the PCC to approve an **operational boundary limit for external debt** for the same time period. The proposed operational boundary for external debt is the same calculation as the authorised limit without the additional headroom. The operational boundary represents a key management tool for in year monitoring.

Within the operational boundary, figures for borrowing and other long-term liabilities are separately identified again. The PCC is asked to delegate authority to the Chief Finance Officer (OPCCN), within the total operational boundary for any individual year, to make any required changes between the separately agreed figures for borrowing and other long-term liabilities. Any changes will be reported to the PCC.

Operational Boundary Limit for External Debt			
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
	£m	£m	£m
PWLB borrowing	33.873	40.492	45.060
Other long term liabilities (OCC PFI)	23.373	22.679	21.906
Other long term liabilities (PIC PFI)	31.848	30.771	29.634
Total	89.094	93.943	96.600

Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) MRP Policy and Statement for 2021/22.

1. Introduction

- 1.1 The PCC is required to make a charge against the revenue budget each year in respect of capital expenditure financed by borrowing or credit arrangement. The annual charge is set aside for the eventual repayment of the loan and is known as the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP). This is separate from any annual interest charges that are incurred on borrowing.
- 1.2 The Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2008 amend the way in which MRP can be calculated so that each authority must consider what is “prudent”. The regulations are backed up by statutory guidance which gives advice on what might be considered prudent.

2. Options for Making Prudent Provision

- 2.1 Four options are included in the guidance, which are those likely to be most relevant for the majority of local government bodies. Although other approaches are not ruled out, local government bodies must demonstrate that they are fully consistent with the statutory duty to make prudent revenue provision.

Option 1 - Regulatory Method

Authorities may continue to use the formulae put in place by the previous regulations.

Option 2 - Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) Method

Under this option, MRP is equal to 4% of the non-housing CFR at the end of the preceding financial year.

Option 3 – Asset Life Method

This is to make provision over the estimated life of the asset for which the borrowing is undertaken. This could be done by:

- (a) Charging MRP in equal instalments over the life of the asset
- (b) Charge MRP on an annuity basis, where MRP is the principal element for the year of the annuity required to repay over the asset’s useful life the amount of capital expenditure financed by borrowing or credit arrangements. The authority should use an appropriate interest rate to calculate the amount. Adjustments to the calculation to take account of repayment by other methods during repayment period (e.g. by the application of capital receipts) should be made as necessary.

Option 4 - Depreciation

MRP is deemed to be equal to the provision required in accordance with depreciation accounting in respect of the asset on which expenditure has been financed by borrowing or credit arrangements. This should include any amount for impairment charged to the income and expenditure accounts.

- 2.2 The regulations make a distinction between capital expenditure incurred before 1 April 2008 and capital expenditure incurred from 1 April 2008 in terms of the options available.
- 2.3 Options 1 and 2 are to be used for capital expenditure incurred pre April 2008. Options 3 and 4 are to be used for Capital expenditure incurred post April 2008.

3. MRP Policy

- 3.1 Before 1 April 2019 the option adopted for expenditure incurred after 1 April 2008 was Option 3a (Equal Instalment method). This method was deemed prudent whilst assets were primarily being internally financed.
- 3.2 As reserves, cash and investment balances have been consumed following the decrease in direct government funding, it is now necessary to externally finance capital expenditure on long life assets. The current preferred financing method is via the Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) borrowed on an annuity basis.
- 3.3 Option 3b (Annuity Method) is adopted for capital expenditure chargeable as MRP for the first time after 1 April 2019. The principal reason for this change was for the charge to revenue to reflect the capital repayment basis on the associated finance. This method will therefore adopt a similar MRP basis as those assets financed through lease or PFI arrangements.
- 3.4 The revised Statutory Guidance released on 2 February 2018 stipulates that this change in policy cannot be applied retrospectively to assets placed in service prior to the date the revised policy was introduced. Therefore Option 3a still applies to capital expenditure chargeable as MRP for the first time prior to 1 April 2019.

4. Recommendations

- 4.1 It is proposed that the following MRP policy is adopted as follows for 2021/22:
- Capital expenditure incurred before April 2008 is treated in accordance with Option 1 of the regulatory guidance;
 - Capital expenditure chargeable as MRP for the first time from 1 April 2008 to 31 March 2019 is treated in accordance with Option 3(a) of the regulatory guidance.
 - Capital expenditure chargeable as MRP for the first time after 1 April 2019 is treated in accordance with Option 3(b) of the regulatory guidance.

LINK ASSET SERVICES

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

UK.

The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee kept Bank Rate unchanged on 5th November. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5th November to 2nd December which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that "announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target".

Its forecasts appeared, at the time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:

- o The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
- o The Bank also expects there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
- o CPI inflation is therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the "inflation risks were judged to be balanced".

Significantly, there was no mention of negative interest rates in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it "stands ready to adjust monetary policy", the MPC this time said that it will take "whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit". The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank's willingness to embrace new tools.

One key addition to the Bank's forward guidance in August was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years due to the slow rate of recovery of the economy and the need for the Government to see the burden of the elevated debt to GDP ratio falling significantly. Inflation is unlikely to pose a threat requiring increases in Bank Rate during this period as there is likely to be spare capacity in the economy for a considerable time. It is expected to briefly peak at around 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.

However, the minutes did contain several references to downside risks. The MPC reiterated that the "recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to

be skewed to the downside". It also said "the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material". Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. That could involve some or all of the lockdown being extended beyond 2nd December, a temporary relaxation of restrictions over Christmas, a resumption of the lockdown in January and lots of regions being subject to Tier 3 restrictions when the lockdown ends. Hopefully, restrictions should progressively ease during the spring. It is only to be expected that some businesses that have barely survived the first lockdown, will fail to survive the second lockdown, especially those businesses that depend on a surge of business in the run up to Christmas each year. This will mean that there will be some level of further permanent loss of economic activity, although the extension of the furlough scheme to the end of 31st March will limit the degree of damage done.

As for upside risks, we have been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9th November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, their phase three trials are still only two-thirds complete. More data needs to be collected to make sure there are no serious side effects. We don't know exactly how long immunity will last or whether it is effective across all age groups. The Pfizer vaccine specifically also has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70C that might make it more difficult to roll out. However, the logistics of production and deployment can surely be worked out over the next few months.


However, there has been even further encouraging news since then with another two vaccines announcing high success rates. Together, these three announcements have enormously boosted confidence that life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels, which would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate currently being exceptionally high, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could begin to be eased, possibly in Q2 2021, once vulnerable people and front-line workers had been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% next year instead of 9%. But while this would reduce the need for more QE and/or negative interest rates, increases in Bank Rate would still remain some years away. There is also a potential question as to whether the relatively optimistic outlook of the Monetary Policy Report was swayed by making positive assumptions around effective vaccines being available soon. It should also be borne in mind that as effective vaccines will take time to administer, economic news could well get worse before it starts getting better.

Public borrowing is now forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PwLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt

issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.

Overall, the pace of recovery was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp but after a disappointing increase in GDP of only 2.1% in August, this left the economy still 9.2% smaller than in February; this suggested that the economic recovery was running out of steam after recovering 64% of its total fall during the crisis. The last three months of 2020 were originally expected to show zero growth due to the impact of widespread local lockdowns, consumers probably remaining cautious in spending, and uncertainty over the outcome of the UK/EU trade negotiations concluding at the end of the year also being a headwind. However, the second national lockdown starting on 5th November for one month is expected to depress GDP by 8% in November while the rebound in December is likely to be muted and vulnerable to the previously mentioned downside risks. It was expected that the second national lockdown would push back recovery of GDP to pre pandemic levels by six months and into sometime during 2023. However, the graph below shows what Capital Economics forecast will happen now that there is high confidence that successful vaccines will be widely administered in the UK in the first half of 2021; this would cause a much quicker recovery than in their previous forecasts.

Chart: Level of real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100)




(if unable to print in colour..... the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.)

This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to 2% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be

in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assume that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perversely!), depress economic growth and recovery.

Chart: Public Sector Net Borrowing (As a % of GDP)



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Capital Economics have not revised their forecasts for Bank Rate or gilt yields after this major revision of their forecasts for the speed of recovery of economic growth, as they are also forecasting that inflation is unlikely to be a significant threat and so gilt yields are unlikely to rise significantly from current levels.

There will still be some painful longer term adjustments as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.


The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) report on 6th August revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to "somewhat less than £80bn". It stated that in its assessment "banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC's central projection". The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC's projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

US

The result of the November elections means that while the Democrats have gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans will retain their slim majority in the Senate. This means that the Democrats will not be able to do a massive fiscal stimulus, as they had been hoping to do after the elections, as they will have to get agreement from the Republicans. That would have resulted in another surge of debt issuance and could have put particular upward pressure on debt yields – which could then have also put upward pressure on gilt yields. On the other hand, equity prices leapt up on 9th November on the first news of a successful vaccine and have risen further during November as more vaccines announced successful results. This could cause a big shift in investor sentiment i.e. a swing to sell out of government debt to buy into equities which would normally be expected to cause debt prices to fall and yields to rise. However, the rise in yields has been quite muted so far and it is too early to say whether the Fed would feel it necessary to take action to suppress any further rise in debt yields. It is likely that the next two years, and possibly four years in the US, could be a political stalemate where neither party can do anything radical.

The economy had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a third wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the latest wave has been driven by a growing outbreak in the Midwest. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is the single biggest downside risk to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.

COVID-19 New infections & hospitalisations



However, with the likelihood that highly effective vaccines are going to become progressively widely administered during 2021, this should mean that life will start to return to normal during quarter 2 of 2021. Consequently, there should be a sharp pick-up in growth during that quarter and a rapid return to the pre-pandemic level of growth by the end of the year.

After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target in his Jackson Hole speech in late August, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that "it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time." This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The Fed also called on Congress to end its political disagreement over providing more support for the unemployed as there is a limit to what monetary policy can do compared to more directed central government fiscal policy. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal. The Fed's meeting on 5 November was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections.

EU

The economy was recovering well towards the end of Q2 and into Q3 after a sharp drop in GDP caused by the virus, (e.g. France 18.9%, Italy 17.6%). However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4, and Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries, and is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the worst affected countries. With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, the ECB has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. It is therefore expected that it will have to provide more monetary policy support through more quantitative easing purchases of bonds in the absence of sufficient fiscal support from governments. The current PEPP scheme of €1,350bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, the PEPP scheme is regarded as being a temporary measure during this crisis so it may need to be increased once the first PEPP runs out during early 2021. It could also decide to focus on using the Asset Purchase Programme to make more monthly purchases, rather than the PEPP scheme, and it does have other monetary policy options.

However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle during the closing and opening quarters of this year and next year respectively before it finally breaks through into strong growth in quarters 2 and 3. The ECB will now have to review whether more monetary support will be required to help recovery in the shorter term or to help individual countries more badly impacted by the pandemic.

China

After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies.

However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.

Japan

Japan's success in containing the virus without imposing draconian restrictions on activity should enable a faster return to pre-virus levels of output than in many major economies. While the second wave of the virus has been abating, the economy has been continuing to recover at a reasonable pace from its earlier total contraction of 8.5% in GDP. However, there now appears to be the early stages of the start of a third wave. It has also been struggling to get out of a deflation trap for many years and to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. There has also been little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. The change of Prime Minister is not expected to result in any significant change in economic policy.

World growth

While Latin America and India have, until recently, been hotspots for virus infections, infection rates have begun to stabilise. World growth will be in recession this year. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing globalisation i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for


nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

Summary

Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.

If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.

The graph below as at 10th November, shows how the 10 and 30 year gilt yields in the UK spiked up after the Pfizer vaccine announcement on the previous day, (though they have levelled off during late November at around the same elevated levels): -



INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

Link Group Interest Rate View		9.11.20												
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20														
	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60

Brexit

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link above are predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. However, as the differences between a Brexit deal and a no deal are not as big as they once were, the economic costs of a no deal have diminished. The bigger risk is that relations between the UK and the EU deteriorate to such an extent that both sides start to unravel the agreements already put in place. So what really matters now is not whether there is a deal or a no deal, but what type of no deal it could be.

The differences between a deal and a no deal were much greater immediately after the EU Referendum in June 2016, and also just before the original Brexit deadline of 29.3.19. That's partly because leaving the EU's Single Market and Customs Union makes this Brexit a relatively "hard" one. But it's mostly because a lot of arrangements have already been put in place. Indeed, since the Withdrawal Agreement laid down the terms of the break-up, both the UK and the EU have made substantial progress in granting financial services equivalence and the UK has replicated the bulk of the trade deals it had with non-EU countries via the EU. In a no deal in these circumstances (a "cooperative no deal"), GDP in 2021 as a whole may be only 1.0% lower than if there were a deal. In this situation, financial services equivalence would probably be granted during 2021 and, if necessary, the UK and the EU would probably rollover any temporary arrangements in the future.

The real risk is if the UK and the EU completely fall out. The UK could override part or all of the Withdrawal Agreement while the EU could respond by starting legal proceedings and few measures could be implemented to mitigate the disruption on 1.1.21. In such an "uncooperative no deal", GDP could be 2.5% lower in 2021 as a whole than if there was a deal. The acrimony would probably continue beyond 2021 too, which may lead to fewer agreements in the future and the expiry of any temporary measures.

Relative to the slump in GDP endured during the COVID crisis, any hit from a no deal would be small. But the pandemic does mean there is less scope for policy to respond. Even so, the Chancellor could loosen fiscal policy by about £10bn (0.5% of GDP) and target it at those sectors hit hardest. The Bank of England could also prop up demand, most likely through more gilt and corporate bond purchases rather than negative interest rates.

Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

So in summary there is not likely to be any change in Bank Rate in 20/21 – 21/22 due to whatever outcome there is from the trade negotiations and while there will probably be some movement in gilt yields / PWLB rates after the deadline date, there will probably be minimal enduring impact beyond the initial reaction.

The balance of risks to the UK

The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus and how quickly successful vaccines may become available and widely administered to the population. It may also be affected by what, if any, deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.

There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

UK - further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions in major conurbations during 2021.

UK / EU trade negotiations – if they were to cause significant economic disruption and downturn in the rate of growth.

UK government takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.

UK - Bank of England takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.

A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for “weaker” countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next year or so. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low

debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.

Weak capitalisation of some European banks, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.

German minority government & general election in 2021. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she intends to remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.

Other minority EU governments. Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.

Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. In November, Hungary and Poland threatened to veto the 7 year EU budget due to the inclusion of a rule of law requirement that poses major challenges to both countries. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.

Geopolitical risks, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

UK - a significant rise in inflationary pressures. These could be caused by an uncooperative Brexit deal or by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population which leads to a resumption of normal life and a return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.

The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

Post-Brexit – if a positive agreement was reached that removed the majority of threats of economic disruption between the EU and the UK.